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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this CERCLA and Spill Act case, the appellant, the 
New Jersey Turnpike Authority ("Turnpike") seeks to hold 
the appellees liable for contribution for the contamination 
of a number of sites along the Turnpike with chromate ore 
processing residue, or COPR, under standard theories of 
liability and under an alternative liability theory. We 
conclude that the Turnpike has not produced sufficient 
evidence to survive appellees' summary judgment motion 
under either CERCLA or the Spill Act or under an 
alternative liability theory, and will affirm the District 
Court's order on this basis. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
This case is the latest of a series of legal actions 
attempting to affix liability against these appellees for COPR 
contamination in New Jersey in both the state and federal 
courts.  The instant litigation centers around seven different 
sites along the New Jersey Turnpike that the Turnpike 
alleges have been contaminated with COPR. In this action, 
the Turnpike relies largely upon prior investigations and 
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actions of other parties, and the records made in 
connection with those cases, to prove liability of appellees 
for contribution for the sites in question. 
 
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
("NJDEP") has denoted these areas as site numbers, 7, 20, 
21, 56, 131, 192, and 201.1 According to the Turnpike, 
these seven sites, among others, received COPR, directly or 
indirectly, from appellees from the early 1950s to the mid 
1970s. A. at 46a-47a. 
 
The three appellees, Allied-Signal ("Allied"), PPG 
Industries ("PPG"), and Occidental and Maxus Corporation 
("Occidental") involved in this appeal, or their corporate 
predecessors, were processors of chromium ore. A. at 30a, 
34a. From the early 1900s until 1976, Allied, PPG, and 
Occidental were the only companies in New Jersey 
processing chromium. A. at 499a, 501a. Outside of their 
plants, the next closest chromate chemical production 
facility was in Glens Falls, New York. A. at 500a, 1057a. 
Allied, PPG, and Occidental sold or gave the COPR 
produced at their plants to contractors for construction fill 
or other uses. A. at 962a, 903a, 923-38a, 1241a, 894a, 
957a-960a, 897a, 922a, 981a. Neither the appellees nor the 
Turnpike has kept records of COPR disposal or purchase. 
A. at 903a, 1069a, 681a, 713a. 
 
The NJDEP began investigating possible chromium 
contamination at sites in New Jersey in the 1980s. 2 In 
1988, the NJDEP issued a "Directive" to Allied-Signal, PPG, 
and Occidental. The NJDEP stated that the Directive was 
issued for the following purposes: 
 
         in order to notify [Allied, PPG, and Occidental] that the 
         Department, pursuant to the provisions of the [Spill 
         Act] has determined that it is necessary to remove or 
         arrange for the removal of certain hazardous 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Earlier versions of the record below indicate that the Turnpike 
initially 
focused on site 198, but the parties appear to be in agreement that it is 
site 192 that is at issue in this case. 
 
2. The Turnpike was made aware of the presence of COPR at some of the 
sites at issue in this case from the Director of the Hazardous Waste Task 
Force of New Jersey in 1984. A. at 281a. 
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         substances, and in order to notify [Allied, PPG, and 
         Occidental] that the Department believes them to be 
         responsible for the discharge of such hazardous 
         substances. A. at 499a. 
 
The Directive put appellees on notice of 118 contaminated 
sites, including four of the sites at issue here, Sites 7, 20, 
and 21 in Jersey City, and Site 56 in Kearny. A. at 507- 
12a. The Directive assigned collective responsibility for 
these sites to Allied, PPG, and Occidental, because it could 
not identify which company had discharged chromate waste 
at these and other sites. A. at 502a. In 1990, Occidental 
entered into an administrative consent order with the 
NJDEP relating to 26 chrome-contaminated sites in Kearny, 
including Turnpike sites 56 and 131. 339a-364a. 
Occidental agreed, via this administrative consent order, to 
propose and implement remedial measures at all of the 
Kearny sites listed. A. at 343a-347a.3  This order did not 
include an admission of liability or fault by Occidental for 
the sites. A. at 343a, 362a, 495a. Occidental has spent 
more than $700,000 on investigation and remedial 
measures at the Kearny sites, and over $47 million at the 
non-Turnpike Kearny sites. A. at 1138a-41a. PPG has also 
signed an administrative consent order whereby it has been 
investigating and remediating over 55 sites in Hudson 
County. A. at 626-68a. 
 
The NJDEP issued another Directive in 1989 that set 
forth the following as its "findings": 1) Allied had reported 
that it could not account for the disposition of all its 
chromate chemical waste, but that it had been used as fill 
at offsite locations and had been stored at one of its 
production sites and then used as fill in construction 
projects; 2) Occidental employees had reported that 
chromate chemical waste had been used as fill in wetlands 
areas or in construction projects and roadway construction; 
and 3) during the late 50s and early 60s, PPG allowed 
approximately 40 tons per day of chromate chemical 
production waste to be taken free of charge from the PPG 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. When the NJDEP identified Turnpike Site 201 as a new chrome site in 
1996, Occidental agreed to treat the site as one covered by the 
administrative consent order. A. at 494a-95a. 
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site. A. at 524-26a. The Directive also cited the testimony of 
PPG employees in prior cases that its waste was used as fill 
in Jersey City, and was sold and used for fill in 
construction and industrial sites. A. at 527a. Other NJDEP 
Directives were issued that discussed how waste from the 
PPG and Allied plants were used as fill, and these 
Directives also observed that both Allied and PPG had 
entered into administrative consent orders with the NJDEP 
to determine remedial plans without admitting liability. A. 
at 551-52a, 559-62a, 585-86a, 593-620a, 626a-34a, 635- 
664a. 
 
This activity spawned a series of lawsuits in state and 
federal courts seeking damages for personal injury and 
property claims arising out of chrome ore residue, and the 
courts in Hudson County, New Jersey, in particular, have 
been the locus of a number of suits.4 See, e.g., Jersey City 
Redevelopment Authority v. PPG Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 85- 
2014, 1987 WL 54410 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 1987), aff'd, 866 
F.2d 1410-11 (3d Cir. 1988); Florence Trum, et al. v. Allied 
Signal, et al., Docket No. W-14248-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. Feb. 11, 1993) (order granting summary judgment in 
favor of PPG and Allied); Gertrude Settle v. PPG Indus., Inc. 
et al., Docket No. W-10654-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 7, 1996) (order granting summary judgment in favor 
of Allied); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Lawrence Construction Co., et 
al., Docket No. L-195-93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. April 11, 
1996) (consent order). The Hudson County litigation that is 
relied upon most frequently by the Turnpike in this appeal, 
Exxon v. PPG Indus., et al., was filed in 1990, and the 
appellees, or their corporate predecessors, were named in 
this suit. 
 
In May 1993, the Turnpike filed suit in District Court, 
alleging claims under CERCLA, the New Jersey Spill Act, 
tort, contract, and quasi-contract claims, and a declaratory 
judgment claim against numerous defendants, including 
insurance companies, construction and trucking 
companies, and corporations alleged to have produced 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. For example, Allied's counsel in this matter has handled 
approximately fifteen cases on behalf of the corporation in the state and 
federal courts in New Jersey. A. at 1285a. 
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COPR. Discovery efforts in this matter were sporadic at 
best. In February, 1994, the Magistrate Judge entered a 
case management order that indicated that discovery would 
be conducted in phases, and that the first phase of 
discovery would include document requests, interrogatories, 
and depositions. The parties exchanged documents and 
interrogatory answers shortly thereafter. For a period of at 
least twelve months afterward, however, the Turnpike 
sought no discovery from any defendant or third party on 
the question of liability. We also note that there appeared to 
be little or no discovery taken by any party for almost two 
years. 
 
On October 16, 1996, the Magistrate Judge issued an 
order closing fact discovery at the request of Allied, so that 
its dispositive motion could be filed. The Turnpike appealed 
this decision to the District Court and received an 
extension of time to pursue fact discovery on the issue of 
liability through March 15, 1997, and on the subject of 
damages through September 15, 1997. The Turnpike served 
five deposition notices, and withdrew all but one. In sum, 
the Turnpike did take one, one hour deposition in this case 
in 1997, served written discovery requests on the appellees, 
and it obtained from various sources 102 deposition 
transcripts, but it concedes that it did not review all of 
those transcripts. Allied, PPG, and Occidental moved for 
summary judgment, as did the Turnpike. In support of its 
motion for summary judgment, the Turnpike quoted and 
utilized deposition testimony from prior actions and also 
relied heavily on statements made in the NJDEP Directives 
and the administrative consent orders that the appellees 
had entered into with the NJDEP. The District Court heard 
oral argument on the motions, and then ruled in favor of 
Allied, PPG, and Occidental on the Turnpike's federal and 
state law claims. This order became final upon dismissal of 
all other claims.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Judgment had been entered previously in favor of USF&G, Travelers 
Insurance Co., and N.J. Manufacturers Insurance Co., and is not a 
subject of this appeal. A. at 241-44a. Summary judgment was granted in 
favor of appellees on May 15, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the District 
Court entered an order: 1) dismissing all of the claims against the John 
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The focus of the District Court's opinion was the 
Turnpike's assertion that an alternative liability theory 
should be applied. In its opinion, the District Court noted 
that the Turnpike had admitted it could not produce direct 
evidence to prove CERCLA liability, and that it had instead 
urged the Court to apply an alternative liability doctrine, 
whereby the "burden would shift to the Generator 
Defendants to prove that COPR originating from its plant 
was not the source of the COPR detected on each site in 
question." New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. PPG Industries, 
Inc., 16 F. Supp.2d 460, 468 (D.N.J. 1998). In examining 
the Turnpike's alternative liability arguments, the District 
Court noted that under any burden-shifting framework, a 
plaintiff still had an initial burden of demonstrating that 
two or more actors joined as defendants acted tortiously 
toward that plaintiff, and that all culpable defendants were 
joined in the action. See id. at 470 (citing Shackil v. Lederle 
Laboratories, 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989); McLaughlin v. Acme 
Pallet Co. 658 A.2d 1314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)). 
Without deciding the question of whether a theory of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Doe Defendants without prejudice; 2) stating that any and all claims by 
the Turnpike against Natural Products Refining Co., F.S.F. Company, 
Mutual Chemical Company of America, Oxy-Diamond Alkali Corporation, 
Martin Dennis Company, George M. Brewster & Sons, Inc., Felhaber 
Corporation, Reid Contracting Company, Inc., Klevens Corporation, Horn 
Construction Company, and American Mutual Liability Insurance 
Company were acknowledged by the Turnpike to be defunct, and 
dismissing those claims; 3) dismissing counterclaims and cross claims 
by the appellees with the exception of the counterclaims brought by 
Occidental, which were "stayed and administratively terminated pending 
disposition of any appeals from this Court's Order dated May 15, 1998." 
The order was accompanied by correspondence stating that the order 
was issued to ensure finality prior to appeal, and that no 54(b) 
certification was necessary. We questioned whether this court had 
jurisdiction in the absence of a 54(b) certification, and counsel sought a 
54(b) certification from the District Court. A 54(b) certification was 
entered by the District Court and presented to this court at argument. 
We conclude that any jurisdictional defects inherent in the District 
Court's August 4, 1998 order were cured by the 54(b) certification, and 
that we therefore have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See 
Instructional Systems, Inc., 35 F.3d 813, 818 n.9 (3d Cir. 1994); Feather 
v. United Mine Workers of America, 711 F.2d 530, 535 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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alternative liability is applicable to cases brought under 
CERCLA, the District Court found that even if this theory 
could apply, the Turnpike had not demonstrated that 
alternative liability should be applied to this case. See id. at 
470-71. The District Court noted that the Turnpike was not 
a proper "innocent" party to be aided by an alternative 
liability doctrine, as it was also potentially liable for the 
COPR contamination at its sites under CERCLA, and that 
the Turnpike, rather than the appellees, was in a better 
position to uncover evidence relating to causation. 6 See id. 
For these reasons, the District Court declined to apply the 
doctrine of alternative liability to the Turnpike's claims. 
 
The District Court also concluded that the Turnpike's 
evidentiary proffers were not sufficient in and of themselves 
to establish a question of material fact, under either 
CERCLA or the Spill Act. The District Court noted that the 
Turnpike had not produced sufficient competent evidence 
to demonstrate that Allied or PPG's facility had deposited 
COPR on any of the sites at issue, and that the Turnpike 
had not produced sufficient evidence against Occidental as 
to sites 7, 20, 21 and 192. See id. at 472. The District 
Court then took a closer look at the evidence produced by 
the Turnpike against Occidental with respect to sites 56, 
131, and 201 and concluded that the Turnpike could not 
produce adequate evidence against Occidental with respect 
to these sites to survive summary judgment under 
CERCLA. See id. at 472-75. The District Court also found 
that the Turnpike had not produced sufficient evidence to 
survive summary judgment on its Spill Act claims, and it 
also addressed and denied the Turnpike's other state law 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court made the following comments as to proof of 
causation: 
 
         [O]ne of the primary justifications for invoking the alternative 
         liability doctrine -- to provide redress for injuries that would 
not be 
         remedied otherwise -- is plainly absent here. The alleged damage 
         here -- the environmental harm -- is already being addressed in 
         ongoing NJDEP proceedings, which have already secured the 
         agreement of Occidental to address three of the seven sites in 
         question. 
 
16 F. Supp.2d at 471. 
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claims. The Turnpike argues on appeal that the District 
Court erred by 1) failing to consider evidence that would 
link Allied, PPG, and Occidental to the COPR found at the 
Turnpike sites; 2) refusing to shift the burden of proving 
causation to the defendants under an alternative liability 
theory; and 3) exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the 
Turnpike's state law claims, where the claims presented 
novel and complex issues of state law. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 42 U.S.C. 
S 9613(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. Our review of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. See United States v. USX Corp., 68 
F.3d 811, 819 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. CERCLA 
 
Both CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9601, and the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), were 
enacted to provide for liability and remediation of 
hazardous substances in the environment and for cleanup 
of inactive hazardous waste sites. Section 107 of CERCLA 
assigns liability to four categories of "potentially responsible 
parties" or PRPs for costs of removal or remediation or 
hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a). A PRP includes: 1) 
the current owner or operator of a facility; 2) any person 
who owned or operated the facility at the time of the 
disposal of a hazardous substance; 3) any person who 
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged for 
transport for disposal or treatment of hazardous 
substances at a facility; and 4) any person who accepts or 
accepted hazardous substances for transport to sites 
selected by such person. See New Castle County v. 
Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
In order to prove CERCLA liability under section 107, a 
plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant is a PRP; 2) that 
hazardous substances were disposed of at a "facility"; 3) 
that there has been a "release" or "threatened" release of 
hazardous substances from the facility into the 
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environment; and 4) that the release or threatened release 
has required or will require the plaintiff to incur"response 
costs." See 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a); United States v. CDMG 
Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 712 (3d Cir. 1996). A section 107 
cost recovery action may only be pursued by an innocent 
party that has undertaken hazardous waste cleanup, and 
section 107 imposes strict liability and joint and several 
liability on PRPs for costs associated with cleanup and 
remediation. Id. at 1120-21. In order to prove a case where 
a CERCLA plaintiff asserts that a PRP has "arranged" for 
the transportation or disposal of hazardous substances, our 
prior case law is clear that such a plaintiff "must simply 
prove that the defendant's hazardous substances were 
deposited at the site from which there was a release and 
that the release caused the incurrence of response costs." 
See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 
266 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Section 113 of SARA provides for recovery by way of 
contribution by one PRP from another PRP. See  42 U.S.C. 
S 9613(f)(1). A section 113 contribution action allows a PRP 
to recover a portion of its expenditures when that PRP 
believes that it has assumed a share of the costs that is 
greater than its equitable share under the circumstances. 
See New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1121-22; see also In re 
Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1119 (3d Cir. 1997). A section 
113 plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants are 
liable or potentially liable under 107; the elements for both 
claims are essentially the same.7See 42 U.S.C. S 9613(f)(1); 
Prisco v. A & D Carting Corp., 168 F.3d 593, 603 (2d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Under Section 113(f)(1), once a contribution plaintiff has demonstrated 
section 107 liability, it must then demonstrate that apportionment is 
feasible. See New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122; United States v. 
Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995). 
A court "may allocate response costs among liable parties using such 
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." See 42 U.S.C. 
S 9613(f)(1). In any given case, a court may consider several factors or a 
few, depending on the totality of the circumstances and equitable 
considerations. See New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122-23; 50 F.3d at 
1536 (discussing approaches to apportioning contribution claims under 
S 113(f)(1)). We will not discuss the apportionment question, given that 
we find that the Turnpike has not demonstrated CERCLA liability on the 
part of the appellees. 
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1999); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 
1998); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts. , 94 F.3d 
1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996); see also CDMG Realty Co., 96 
F.3d at 712. However, section 113 does not "in itself create 
any new liabilities; rather, it confirms the right of a 
potentially responsible person under section 107 to obtain 
contribution from other potentially responsible persons." 
New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1121. The Turnpike is a 
PRP, as the current owner and operator of the sites, and its 
action against other PRPs is properly characterized as a 
section 113 action. See id. at 1120-22.8 
 
The Turnpike argues that all three appellees are PRPs by 
virtue of their having arranged for disposal and transport of 
the COPR at the seven sites. See 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a)(3). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note at the outset that the Turnpike is seeking recovery primarily 
of litigation costs; we express no view as to what they could recover in 
this action. In the course of discovery, the Turnpike summarized its 
damage claim as follows: 
 IAG, Ltd.               $   99,810.36            "insurance archeology" 
services 
                                                  related to a dismissed 
declaratory 
                                                  judgment action against 
the 
                                                  Turnpike's insurers  
 
SMC Environmental        $  850,699.95            management services for 
Services Group                                    litigation, unspecified  
as to the sites  
 
Louis Berger             $  184,089.13            unspecified as to 
activities or 
& Associates                                      sites where costs 
incurred  
 
Sills, Cummis            $  801,960.33            legal fees and costs  
 
Wolff & Samson           $   19,899.11            legal fees and costs  
 
Schwartz, Tobia,         $  255,108.40            legal fees and costs 
 and Stanziale,  
 
R-1105 Sarria            $   40,379.51            to erect a fence around 
Site 20 as 
Construction                                      an interim remedial 
measure  
 
Rutgers University       $   31,700.00            unspecified Paulus, 
Sokoloski $   85,729.84 unspecified 
& Sartor    
 
TOTAL                                             $2,358,376.63 
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Although the Turnpike acknowledges that in setting forth 
its proofs, it is required to prove the link described in our 
decision in Alcan, it also argues that this requirement is not 
all that exacting, due to the remedial purpose of CERCLA 
and less stringent notions of proof and causation 
underlying a CERCLA claim. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 266- 
69. The Turnpike also argues that in analyzing its 
arguments under the statutory elements of section 113, we 
should look to the entire eastern spur of the Turnpike as 
the "facility" in question. We cannot accept either of these 
contentions. 
 
First, we find that the Turnpike has misconstrued the 
nature of the proof required of a plaintiff under CERCLA. It 
is true that as a CERCLA plaintiff, the Turnpike need not 
prove causation in the traditional sense of the word for the 
appellees to be found liable. However, the statute and our 
case law require some connection between the actions of 
the appellees and the COPR contamination at the sites in 
question.9 We therefore agree with the District Court in this 
matter that in order to fulfill CERCLA's "causation" 
requirements, the Turnpike must offer some proof that 
Allied, PPG, and Occidental deposited, or caused the 
disposal of, COPR at each of the sites at issue in this case. 
See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 266. Some courts, in describing this 
evidentiary burden, have termed it a "nexus" requirement. 
See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 
962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992). Therefore, we agree that 
the burden that CERCLA requires is not an onerous one, 
but we also observe that the Turnpike must nevertheless 
produce sufficient evidence to meet it. 
 
Second, the Turnpike also argues that the eastern spur 
of the New Jersey Turnpike is the "facility" in question, and 
that the sites at issue here can be considered the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In the District Court's words: 
 
         While it is not necessary for [the Turnpike] to . . . trace the 
cause 
         of the response costs to each Generator Defendant, it is not 
enough 
         that it simply prove that each Generator Defendant produced COPR 
         and that COPR was found at each of the sites in question and ask 
         the trier of fact to supply the link. 
 
16 F. Supp.2d at 469. 
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environmentally impacted portions of the overall "facility" 
for the purposes of determining whether the appellees are 
liable.10 However, allowing the "facility" to be the entire 
eastern spur, where the Turnpike's claim seeks costs 
relating to seven specific sites, would result in an 
unwarranted relaxation of the "nexus" required. If the 
Turnpike seeks contribution for contamination at the sites, 
it may not merely prove deposits occurred along the 
"eastern spur." 
 
B. Spill Act 
 
The Spill Act is the New Jersey environmental protection 
act that resembles CERCLA in its purpose, although it sets 
forth a distinct strict liability scheme. The Spill Act 
provides: 
 
         Any person who has discharged a hazardous 
         substance, or is in any way responsible for any 
         hazardous substance, shall be strictly liable, jointly 
         and severally, without regard to fault, for all cleanup 
         and removal costs, no matter by whom incurred. 
 
N.J.S.A. S 58:10-23.11g(c)(1).11  
 
In this appeal, the Turnpike also argues that the Spill Act 
should receive an expansive construction, for its strict 
liability scheme includes any person who is "in any way 
responsible for any hazardous substance," and the Spill Act 
is supposed to be construed liberally to effectuate its 
purposes. See N.J.S.A. S 58:10-23.11x. The Supreme Court 
of New Jersey has determined that a party "even remotely 
responsible for causing contamination will be deemed a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Section 101(9) of CERCLA defines a facility as "A) any building, 
structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe 
into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, 
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container . . . or B) any site or 
area 
where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or 
placed, or otherwise come to be located [in that site or area]." 42 U.S.C. 
S 9601(9). 
 
11. See also N.J.S.A. S 58:10-23.11f(a)(2) (setting forth private right of 
contribution for cleanup costs against persons "in any way responsible 
for a discharged substance who are liable for the cost of the cleanup"). 
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responsible party under the Act."12  See In re Kimber 
Petroleum Corp., 539 A.2d 1181, 1189 (N.J. 1988); State 
Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 468 A.2d 150, 
165-66 (N.J. 1983). However remote a party's responsibility 
under the Spill Act may be, the statute nevertheless 
requires some degree of particularity; one cannot be 
"responsible" for a hazardous substance without having 
some connection to the site on which that substance was 
deposited. In other words, like CERCLA, the Spill Act places 
a burden on the Turnpike to demonstrate some connection 
or nexus between the COPR at the sites in question and the 
appellees in this case.13 See Marsh, 703 A.2d at 931; 
Kimber, 539 A.2d at 1182. 
 
C. Alternative Liability 
 
The Turnpike argues that it produced sufficient evidence 
to survive summary judgment apart from the application of 
an alternative liability theory, but it also argues that the 
District Court erred by failing to shift the burden of proof 
to Allied, PPG, and Occidental via common law principles of 
alternative liability on the basis of the evidence that it 
produced of the appellees' COPR production and disposal. 
Although general tort law principles require a plaintiff to 
bear the burden of proving causation, see Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, S 433B(1) (1965), courts have fashioned 
exceptions to this rule in situations in which plaintiffs 
would be otherwise unable to recover, such as alternative 
liability, market share liability, and enterprise liability. See, 
e.g., Doe v. Cutter Biological Inc., 971 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 
1992); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. As the owner and operator of the sites in question at the time of the 
contamination at issue in this case, the Turnpike is a responsible party 
under the Spill Act. See Marsh v. NJDEP, 703 A.2d 927, 931-33 (N.J. 
1997). 
 
13. A similar interrelation exists between the contribution and the direct 
cost recovery provisions of the Spill Act as is found in CERCLA. N.J.S.A. 
S 58:10-23.11f(a)(2) provides: 
 
         In an action for contribution, the contribution plaintiffs need 
prove 
         only that a discharge occurred for which the contribution 
defendant 
         or defendants are liable pursuant to [S 58:10-23.11g(c)(1)]. 
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1991); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1077 
(N.Y. 1989) (applying market share liability theory); Minnich 
v. Ashland Oil Co., Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1199 (Ohio 1984); 
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 933, 937 (Cal. 
1980) (discussing reasons for applying market share rather 
than enterprise liability theory). The general rule for 
alternative liability is: "Where the conduct of two or more 
actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been 
caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is 
uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is 
upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the 
harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts,S 433B(3). The case 
that effectively established the doctrine of alternative 
liability is Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). In 
Summers, two hunters discharged their guns in the 
direction of the plaintiff, and at trial, the plaintiff was able 
to establish that both hunters were negligent, but the 
plaintiff could not identify the shot that hit him. As a 
response to the problem of proof faced by the injured 
plaintiff, the court required each of the hunters to prove 
that the shot that injured the plaintiff did not come from 
his gun. The justification for the imposition of alternative 
liability is to hold wrongdoers responsible for their conduct, 
and not to allow them to "escape liability merely because 
the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm has 
made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them has 
caused the harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts, S 433B(3) 
cmt. f. 
 
The application of an alternative liability theory does 
place certain requirements on a plaintiff before any burden 
shifting occurs. Some courts have set forth the following 
test for alternative liability: 1) all defendants must have 
acted tortiously; 2) the plaintiff must have been harmed by 
the conduct of at least one of the defendants, and therefore 
plaintiff must bring all possible defendants before the court; 
and 3) the plaintiff must be unable to identify which 
defendant caused the injury. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 
N.W.2d 164, 173 (Mich. 1984). Alternative liability applies 
"only where it is proved that each of two or more actors has 
acted tortiously and that the harm has resulted from the 
conduct of some one of them. On these issues the plaintiff 
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has still the burden of proof." Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
S 433B(3), cmt. g. 
 
The Turnpike argues for the application of alternative 
liability to both the New Jersey Spill Act claim and its 
CERCLA claims. While New Jersey courts have not 
recognized wide-ranging alternative liability or other 
collective liability theories, see Shackil, 561 A.2d at 520; cf. 
James v. Bessemer Processing Co., Inc., 714 A.2d 898, 908- 
10 (N.J. 1998) (discussing difficulties of proving medical 
causation in toxic tort cases, and the caution New Jersey 
courts have utilized in analyzing novel models of 
causation), they have not been entirely hostile to alternative 
liability-based approaches. In rejecting the application of 
market share liability to injuries caused by vaccines, the 
Shackil court indicated that it would not be averse to 
recognizing market share liability in other factual 
situations, "perhaps one where its application would be 
consistent with public policy and where no other remedy 
would be available." 561 A.2d at 529. We do believe it is 
clear that the New Jersey courts have recognized that the 
burden shifting of an alternative liability theory does not 
eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff establish some 
"reasonable connection" between a defendant and the 
ultimate harm that a plaintiff suffers, and that all culpable 
actors be joined as defendants. See id. at 516, 520-21; see 
also Estate of Chin v. St. Barnabas Medical Center , Nos. A- 
11/12, 1999 WL 543286 (N.J. July 28, 1999) (stating that 
plaintiff seeking to shift burden of proof in medical 
malpractice case must demonstrate that: 1) plaintiff is 
blameless; 2) the injury bespeaks negligence on the part of 
one or more of the defendants; 3) all potential defendants 
must be before the court).14 
 
The applicability of alternative liability in the context of 
federal environmental statutes has been food for scholarly 
thought rather than the subject of judicial opinion. See, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. As the Shackil court recognized, the requirement that all potential 
defendants be joined for alternative liability to apply has been relaxed 
in 
"market share" products liability cases, where a plaintiff need only join 
a "substantial share" of the defendants who might have produced or 
supplied the product in question. See 561 A.2d at 516-17. 
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e.g., John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and 
Responsibility, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 1493 (June 1994); John W. 
Mill, Agricultural Chemical Contamination of Ground Water: 
An Econ. Analysis of Alternative Liability Rules, 1991 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 1135 (1991); Thomas C.L. Roberts, Allocation of 
Liability Under CERCLA: A "Carrot and Stick" Formula, 14 
Ecology L.Q. 601, 616-23 (1987); Ora Fred Harris, Jr., Toxic 
Tort Litigation and the Causation Elements, Is there any 
Hope of Reconciliation?, 40 Sw. L.J. 909, 913 (1986); James 
M. Olson, Essay, Shifting the Burden of Proof: How the 
Common Law Can Safeguard Nature and Promote an Earth 
Ethic, 20 Envtl. L. 891 (1990); see also Developments in the 
Law -- Toxic Waste Litigation, Liability Issues in CERCLA 
Cleanup Actions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1520-33 (May 
1986); Paul J. Dickman, Student Article, Leaking 
Underground Storage Tanks: The Scope of Regulatory 
Burdens & Potential Remedies under RCRA and CERCLA , 
21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 619 (Spring 1994); Melinda H. Van der 
Reis, Comment, An Amendment for the Environment: 
Alternative Liability and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, 34 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1269 (1994). However, 
a few courts have recognized the applicability of alternative 
liability theories under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, or RCRA. See, e.g., Aurora National Bank v. 
Tri Star Marketing, 990 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1998); 
Zands v. Nelson, 797 F. Supp. 805, 812-13 (S.D. Cal. 1992).15 
 
The applicability of alternative liability to a CERCLA 
action has not been specifically addressed in federal case 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Zands court set forth the following rule for alternative liability 
in 
its particular case: 1) where plaintiff identifies a period of time during 
which contamination occurred; 2) where owners of the property or 
operators of a gas station are strictly liable for the contamination of 
the 
property that occurred during their period of ownership or operation; 3) 
where plaintiff joins as defendants all persons who owned the property 
or operated the gas station for at least a portion of the time during 
which 
the contamination occurred; 4) but where plaintiff cannot prove which 
owner or operator "caused" the contamination because more than one 
person owned the property and operated the gas station during the 
period of known contamination; 5) the Court will shift the burden to 
each of the owner/operator defendants to show the contamination did 
not occur during the period of the defendant's ownership or operation. 
See 797 F. Supp. at 817-18. 
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law, and we will not decide the issue here, because we find 
that the Turnpike has not produced sufficient evidence to 
survive summary judgment, even if alternative liability were 
to apply. In so stating, we do not reject the concept of 
alternative liability in the context of these statutes out of 
hand; rather, we find that we have not been presented with 
a factual setting in which such a theory is tenable. The 
Turnpike has not met its initial burden of proving that the 
appellees have each directed their actions in such a 
manner toward the Turnpike sites at issue, such that the 
application of some form of an alternative liability theory 
would be appropriate.16 The Turnpike urges that its highly 
circumstantial evidence is enough, but we conclude that it 
presents probabilities rather than proof. It is to this 
evidence that we now turn. 
 
D. Evidence 
 
The record reveals that COPR waste was found at the 
three appellees' chemical processing sites, and that the 
appellees made contracts with various trucking and hauling 
companies to remove the wastes. What is contested here is 
whether reliable evidence ties the COPR of the particular 
defendants to the seven Turnpike sites at issue in this case. 
The Turnpike relies upon NJDEP Directives, expert reports, 
and deposition testimony from other cases.17 We note at the 
outset that the only evidence in all of the material supplied 
that even begins to link appellees with the sites in question 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Our concurring colleague would require that, under an alternative 
liability theory, plaintiff merely had to show that defendants generated 
this specific sort of hazardous waste in the relevant area. We do not 
subscribe to this statement of plaintiff's burden under our case law, 
which, as we have discussed, requires a "connection." Our colleague 
notes that in Summers v. Tice, only a showing of negligence was 
required; however, the factual connection there was clear -- both 
hunters were shooting in plaintiff's direction. 
 
17. The Turnpike relied upon and argued the significance of the 
Administrative Consent Orders in the District Court, but they neither 
rely upon nor cite to these orders on appeal. See Nagle v. Alspach, 8 
F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993); Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 
(3d Cir. 1989). 
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is the depositions in previous cases, and they relate solely 
to sites 7 and 20. 
 
We find the Directives and the proffered expert report to 
be of little probative value, because they contain no 
evidence regarding the responsibility of these appellees for 
COPR deposits at the sites in question. The Turnpike relies 
upon a collection of facts that could be summarized as "if 
it is there, it must be theirs." The Turnpike urges that the 
conceded large scale production of COPR by the appellees, 
the need for its local disposal, the proximity of the 
appellees' production facilities to the sites at issue, and the 
use of this material as fill over the years, combine to create 
a question of material fact as to whether these appellees 
bear responsibility and must pay contributions to the 
Turnpike for depositing COPR at the sites in question. For 
example, the Turnpike argues that since sites 56, 131, and 
201 are close to Occidental's former processing plant, it is 
liable for those sites, and since site 21 is close to PPG's 
plant, PPG should be held accountable for the COPR 
contamination there.18 Although these facts might serve as 
corroboration if there were other proofs of the actual 
involvement of the appellees with disposal at the sites in 
question, they provide no proof whatsoever that they did in 
fact dispose of their COPR at the sites in question. The 
expert report commissioned by the Turnpike from Louis 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Site 192 is close to an Occidental facility in Newark, but it is not 
clear from the record that this particular facility even produced COPR. 
As for the other sites located in Kearny for which the Turnpike seeks to 
hold Occidental accountable, namely, 56, 131, and 201, an internal 
memo by Occidental concedes that chrome in properties surrounding the 
plant in Kearny is probably a result of scattering ore and from the fact 
that "for many years chrome wastes were dumped indiscriminately on 
our own property and anywhere else that seemed to be a likely spot. . . . 
[b]eginning July 17, 1965, the mud trucking contract was awarded to 
Disch, who sold the mud for fill in both highway and building 
construction." A. at 917a. While there is some evidence that Disch sold 
to highway construction projects, nothing in the record links Occidental 
to the Turnpike via Disch. Although Disch was deposed in Route 440 
Vehicle Corp. d/b/a Bob Ciasulli Acura v. James G. Nicholas, et al., No. 
86-5064 (D.N.J.), only one page of that testimony is proffered as part of 
the record before us, and it reveals nothing about where Disch 
distributed or sold the waste. 
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Berger and Associates is even less helpful, since it paints a 
generalized contamination scenario at the Turnpike 
locations, again lacking in a link to one or more of the 
appellees, and also lacking in certainty as to the precise 
nature of the contamination. The report indicates that 
sources other than COPR-contaminated constructionfill 
might be at work at some of the sites in question, and it 
draws no conclusions as to which appellee is accountable 
for the contamination at a particular site.19 
 
We also note that, notwithstanding the urgings of the 
Turnpike to the contrary, we are not convinced that even if 
probative, the Directives would constitute admissible 
evidence. Rule 803(8)(C) provides for admissibility in civil 
actions of "factual findings resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the 
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack 
of trustworthiness." The Turnpike contends that the 
Directives are the result of a government investigation and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Site 7: The report states that it could not provide conclusive 
information "to determine whether the chromiumfill was present at the 
site" prior to or during turnpike construction. A. at 385a. Also, the 
report indicates that the chromium present could be the result of 
railroad beds north of the site, and that in general, it was difficult to 
know what activity was most likely to have caused the transportation of 
chromium fill to the site. A. at 408a. 
 
Site 20: The major historical land uses identified at this site were 
railway and roadway transportation. A. at 385a. Thefill used could be 
due to either the Turnpike construction or the railroad embankments on 
this site, or to the presence of a lumber yard in this area or other 
construction. A. at 419a, 445a-46. 
 
Site 21: The report notes that chromium fill might have been present 
prior to the Turnpike construction, as part of a railroad embankment 
traverses this site. A. at 385a, 429a, 446a. 
 
Site 56: The report concludes that chromiumfill was most likely 
transported to the site for the Turnpike authority subsequent to the 
actual roadway construction work. A. at 385a, 446a. 
 
Site 131: The report concludes that it does not appear that the 
Turnpike construction was involved in the transportation of fill to this 
location, although chromium may have been brought to the site via the 
maintenance or creation of an access road at this site. A. at 385a, 446a. 
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are therefore admissible. Appellees challenge the Directives 
as nothing more than a form of notice pleading used to 
serve notice of potential liability for costs of clean up, and, 
although the factual findings set forth within the Directives 
are presumably the result of the NJDEP's own 
investigations, appellees urge that they are not the result of 
an adversarial process. See, e.g., Kimber, 539 A.2d at 1185. 
We think that the appellees have the better argument and 
the findings contained in the Directives have not been 
shown to be admissible as evidence.20 
 
The Turnpike also relies on deposition testimony from 
other litigation as evidence of a link between the sites and 
the appellees but, as noted above, this testimony is helpful 
-- if at all -- only as to sites 7 and 20. The Turnpike 
explains that it has had access to depositions from a range 
of prior cases involving appellees and has produced 
excerpts from some of these cases in the record before us, 
but in support of its arguments as to sites 7 and 20, it 
relies primarily on excerpts from depositions taken in the 
Hudson County case of Exxon v. PPG Indus., et al. 
 
The Turnpike offers these depositions, contending that 
they are probative and admissible. We have our doubts 
regarding their admissibility and we disagree with the 
Turnpike's view of their value as evidence. In order for 
former testimony to be admissible under Rule 804(b)(1): 1) 
the declarant must be unavailable; 2) testimony must be 
taken at a hearing, deposition, or civil action or proceeding; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. 803(8)(C) does not preclude the introduction of opinions and 
conclusions in such reports so long as: 1) all statements in such a report 
must be based on factual investigation; 2) any portion of the report that 
is admitted must be sufficiently trustworthy. See In re Complaint of 
Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., Ltd., 85 F.3d 105, 112 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing 
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988); Clark v. 
Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994)). Four non-exhaustive 
factors may be considered in determining whether a report is sufficiently 
trustworthy: 1) the timeliness of the investigation; 2) the investigator's 
skill and experience; 3) whether a hearing was held; and 4) possible bias 
when reports are prepared with a view to possible litigation. See 85 F.3d 
at 112. The party opposing the introduction of a public report bears the 
"burden of coming forward with enough negative factors to persuade a 
court that a report should not be admitted." See id. at 113. 
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and 3) the party against whom the testimony is now offered 
must have had, or its predecessor in interest must have 
had, an opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. See Kirk 
v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 165 (3d Cir. 1995).21 
The Turnpike has not even attempted to satisfy thefirst or 
third requirement regarding the admissibility of the 
depositions in this proceeding, and given the paucity of 
information in the record before us as to the whereabouts 
of these witnesses and the nature of the prior proceeding, 
it is impossible for us to determine on our own that these 
depositions are admissible. We do not rely solely on this 
concern in assessing the import of this evidence, however, 
because we view the testimony itself as so unreliable and 
imprecise that it does not constitute evidence sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact to withstand 
appellees' summary judgment motion, or to prove the 
Turnpike's own summary judgment motion. 
 
1. Evidence at Site 7 and its Connection with 
Allied's COPR Production 
 
The Turnpike points to testimony given by John Lesofski 
in the Exxon case that he had obtained chrome fill from a 
Reppenhagen, Inc. from the Allied facility and delivered it to 
a large-scale sewer construction project in Jersey City, 
where he witnessed backfilling of the pipeline. Giving the 
Turnpike the benefit of reasonable inferences from their 
assertions, the conclusion we can draw is that Lesofski 
witnessed the backfill of the pipeline.22 Because there 
appear to be at least 16 sites in the pipeline vicinity, his 
testimony does not establish that Allied's fill went to Site 7. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Privity or a common property interest is not required to establish a 
predecessor in interest relationship, rather, a shared interest in the 
material facts and outcome of the case will create such an interest. See 
Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1185-87 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
 
22. In addition, the evidence of Lesofski's testimony that has been 
supplied in the record is not his deposition, but, rather a reference to 
that testimony in one of the NJDEP Directives. 
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In the Exxon case, a trucker, Michael Pitsinos, testified 
that he hauled fill material for Allied, and that he delivered 
to the areas where sewage pipeline was being put down in 
Jersey City. Site 7 is within the area considered to be a 
Jersey City sewerage construction project. However, this 
site does not consist of the entire sewerage project. Further, 
it is not entirely clear that the material Pitsinos transported 
was chrome: he described the material as "black sand, dirty 
sand." which he contrasted with the "gray chrome" at 
another site, which is referred to as the "Route 440" site. A. 
at 1010a-18a. At no point did Pitsinos testify that he 
hauled this material to a Turnpike site as part of a 
construction project. At best, he testified that he 
remembered bringing a load of "fill" -- what kind or its 
origins are not clear -- to the Turnpike on behalf of Laffera 
Construction and that he got stuck in the mud. A. at 1018a.23 
 
2. Site 20 and Connection with PPG COPR Production 
 
The Turnpike also points to other depositions from the 
Exxon case to prove that PPG is accountable for the COPR 
contamination at this site and indicates that the following 
serves as evidence linking PPG to the COPR found at Site 
20: 
 
1. The Turnpike refers to the testimony of Richard J. 
Samuelson, discussing the movement of residue and mud 
off of the PPG property. However, the deposition testimony 
is hearsay, if not double hearsay, for his knowledge is 
based upon a statement by a Robert Widing, who testified 
in another case that his knowledge was based upon a 
statement made to him by a PPG agent, Worth Franklin. A. 
at 1023-24, 1026, 1033. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. There is a letter in the record from Allied's Director of 
Environmental 
Services to the NJDEP indicating that a site other than those involved in 
this litigation was used for fill, but that neither the "make-up nor the 
amount of the fill that was used" were known. A. at 887a. The letter also 
indicates that New Jersey Highway Department may have used "the 
material" for fill in the construction of the Turnpike. Id. Even if this 
letter 
could be construed as reliable evidence, the letter does not acknowledge 
that the material to which it refers is COPR waste nor that it was 
deposited at any of the sites involved in this litigation. A. at 1311a-
12a. 
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2. Richard Kordulak, who testified in his deposition from 
the Exxon case that the PPG material was"distributed all 
over the Caven Point area" and that chromium waste was 
taken to the "Turnpike area, underneath the turnpike at 
the end of Caven Point Avenue." A. at 1044a. However, 
Kordulak's testimony also notes that the time period when 
he witnessed four individuals receiving chromium waste 
from the PPG site was from the late 1960s to the early 
1980s, after PPG had closed its Garfield Avenue facility and 
sold it to others, when the piles of COPR at the site were 
gone. A. at 10sa-11sa. In other words, this testimony is 
relevant to a time period after the events that the Turnpike 
alleges caused the contamination at Site 20. A. at 972-73a.24 
 
3. Testimony by Zygmunt Wozniak in the Exxon case 
indicates that materials were moved from the PPG plant to 
the Turnpike for construction, and that the dump trucks 
returned to the site quickly. A. at 1040-41. However, PPG 
has provided further deposition testimony indicating that 
Wozniak never had any conversations at all with the 
persons who actually transported the material; that he was 
not certain that the trucks he saw at the Turnpike were the 
same as the trucks he saw at the PPG plant; that he did 
not recognize any of the people driving the dump trucks to 
the Turnpike; and that some of the COPR fill used at the 
Turnpike came from somewhere other than the PPG plant 
and that at least some of his knowledge was based on 
hearsay. A. at 4sa-10a. 
 
Even giving the Turnpike the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences from these evidentiary proffers, the testimony is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. In a footnote in its reply brief, the Turnpike says that "Kordulak 
testified, in no uncertain terms, that PPG's waste was delivered to Site 
20 both during and after the time the PPG facilities was in operation and 
that PPG's COPR remained on site as late as 1981. See also Jersey City 
Redevelopment Authority v. PPG Indus., 65 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J. 1987) 
(finding that PPG's COPR was being taken from the Garfield Avenue 
facility in 1975)." The Turnpike notes that,"This testimony is in portions 
of the transcript not provided to the Court by PPG." It then states, "We 
would be pleased, if requested, to provide the Court with the entire 
transcripts of Kordulak's and Wozniak's depositions." We note that this 
evidence is not in the record before and it is not for the court to 
request 
the parties to augment their proof. 
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deficient in several respects: it is vague and imprecise, of 
questionable reliability, and therefore not sufficiently 
probative to create an issue for trial. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (stating that 
summary judgment may be granted if evidence is "merely 
colorable" or is "not significantly probative"); Blackburn v. 
United Parcel Service, 179 F.3d 81, 95 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 
Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 961 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1996)) (noting that a hearsay statement that is not capable 
of being admitted at trial should not be considered at 
summary judgment stage); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 
F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). In sum, we find that the 
evidence produced by the Turnpike is insufficient to prove 
the nexus required for the Turnpike to recover from the 
appellees under either CERCLA or the Spill Act, nor is this 
evidence sufficient to show that each of these appellees 
acted in a tortious manner within the meaning of these 
statutes toward these sites such that an alternative liability 
theory would be appropriate. 
 
We note, further, that we also concur with the District 
Court's conclusion that the Turnpike may not be the 
innocent plaintiff that in fairness should be permitted to 
take advantage of alternative liability. As the District Court 
noted, the Turnpike is a PRP in this case, and a joint 
tortfeasor; as such, it may very well be inappropriate to 
utilize an alternative liability theory, which is meant to 
apply to wholly innocent plaintiffs, to shift the burden of 
proof to its fellow tortfeasors in a contribution action. 
 
We also note that the Turnpike clearly did not do all that 
it could to prove causation such that a burden shifting 
approach should be utilized in this matter.25 The Turnpike's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. As the District Court noted: 
 
         Unlike in the traditional alternative liability scenario, the 
lack of 
         proof of causation here is not due to the Defendant' conduct. In 
fact, 
         [the Turnpike] is in a better position than the Defendants to 
         ascertain the source of the COPR at each site, because [the 
         Turnpike] is the present owner and operator of all seven sites 
and 
         was the entity that contracted to receive the COPR that is the 
source 
         of the contamination. See Blanks v. Murphy, 632 A.2d 1264 (App. 
         Div. 1993) (rejecting burden shifting because plaintiff was in a 
better 
         position to determine the cause of its injury). 
 
16 F. Supp.2d at 471. 
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lack of diligence clearly militates against a finding that 
alternative liability should be applied here. The Turnpike 
was made aware of the presence of COPR at some of the 
sites at issue in 1984, yet did not file suit in this matter 
until 1993, and the process of its fact finding in this case 
has been less than impressive. A. at 271a. Cf. Larton v. 
Blue Giant Equip. of Canada, Ltd., 599 F. Supp. 93, 95 
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (declining to apply alternative liability 
theory, in part because it was not apparent that plaintiff 
could not identify the manufacturer through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence); Abel, 343 N.W.2d at 173 (stating that 
plaintiffs must "make a genuine attempt to identify the 
tortfeasor responsible for the individual injury," and a 
finding of a lack of diligence would preclude utilization of 
alternative liability theory in future DES cases); Bixler v. 
Avondale Mills, 405 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) 
(finding eleven year delay before filing suit made court 
reluctant to adopt alternative liability theory). 
 
The Turnpike has, quite simply, not done enough. The 
Turnpike has, instead, asked us to rewrite the burdens that 
a litigant must meet under the CERCLA and the Spill Act, 
and the burden placed upon a plaintiff when alternative 
liability is applicable, to make up for the shortcomings in 
its proof. We will not do so. We will affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
 
E. Supplemental Jurisdiction 
 
The Turnpike maintains for the first time on appeal that 
the District Court should not have supplemental 
jurisdiction over its state law claims, due to their 
complexity. See 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(1). A district court's 
decision to determine such claims is discretionary, and 
where a party has failed to object to the district court's 
exercise of this jurisdiction, in the absence of special 
circumstances, the challenge is waived. See, e.g., Int'l 
College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 366 
(7th Cir. 1998); Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 
861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We find no exceptional 
circumstances in this case, and hold that the Turnpike has 
waived its objections to the District Court's exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction in this matter. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, Concurring. 
 
I agree with the Court that the Turnpike failed to exercise 
diligence in discovering evidence as to who shipped what 
COPR to the various sites. However, I would ground the 
affirmance of the summary judgment on this factor alone. 
In my view, the Court's insistence that, in order to fulfill 
CERCLA's causation requirements, the Turnpike "must 
offer some proof that Allied, PPG, and Occidental deposited, 
or caused the disposal of, COPR at each of the sites at the 
issue in this case," is too strict a test under the governing 
law of alternate liability. 
 
I believe that the threshold requisites for alternate 
liability are as follows. First, the plaintiff has to show that 
it would be entitled to recover if it established causation. In 
strict liability cases, this would require only a showing of 
actionable harm. Second, the plaintiff should show that 
each defendant did the thing that exposed it to liability. In 
Summers v. Tice, both defendants were negligent. See 199 
P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948). By way of analogy, in CERCLA, the 
requisite action would be generating the relevant kind of 
hazardous waste in the relevant area regardless of fault. 
Third, the plaintiff must join all the defendants who might 
be responsible for the harm, so that it would be clear that 
at least one of the defendants actually did cause the harm. 
See Zands v. Nelson, 797 F. Supp. 805, 813 (S.D. Cal. 
1992); Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Tri Star Marketing, Inc., 990 F. 
Supp. 1020, 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 
I believe that the Turnpike's evidence may be sufficient to 
meet this threshold test for the following reasons: (1) the 
defendants produced large quantities of COPR; (2) no one 
else produced COPR within 150 miles of Hudson County; 
(3) the practice was to dispose of COPR locally; (4) the 
defendants freely and indiscriminately disposed of COPR in 
and around Hudson County; (5) the defendants' COPR was 
used in various construction and development projects; (6) 
the Turnpike was building the Turnpike and buyingfill 
material at the same time as the defendants were disposing 
of COPR as fill; (7) the defendants understood that COPR 
was being used as fill in highway projects; (8) the seven 
sites are in close proximity to the defendants' facilities. I 
would nonetheless affirm the judgment because I believe 
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that, in addition to the requirements set forth above, 
alternate liability doctrine demands that the plaintiff 
exercise diligence in determining the identity of the other 
responsible parties, yet the Turnpike failed to do so. 
 
I also take issue with the statement of the court that the 
alternate liability theory is meant to apply to wholly 
innocent plaintiffs. Consider the seminal alternate liability 
case, Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) The plaintiff, 
after telling the defendants, with whom he was hunting 
quail on an open range, that they all should remain in a 
line, went up a hill and thus put himself at the tip of a 
triangle the base of which was formed by the other hunters. 
The plaintiff was in this position when he was shot. Despite 
being far from an innocent plaintiff, he was able to recover. 
See id. at 1. This result belies the Court's contention. 
Moreover, a contributorily negligent plaintiff could surely 
recover in a S 402(A) case where contributory negligence is 
not a defense, and yet alternate liability applies. 
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